May I begin our book launch this evening by acknowledging the traditional owners of the lands on which we are meeting, the Wurundjeri people of the Kulin nations, and by paying respects to their elders, past and present, and the elders from other communities who may be present this evening.
Disruption, and how we respond to disruption, now defines the global foreign policy environment.
In a period characterised by widespread disruption, global leaders are facing a world where geo-strategic and geo-economic forces increasingly diverge, and where inequality, conflict, social breakdown, and the reappearance of nationalism are interacting in ways with which we are largely unfamiliar and unprepared.
But disruption generates innovation and opportunity, and this is a period where events and trends call on us to re-think how we do things.
Humanitarian intervention and international development are front of mind issues at present, since both are at the heart of an innovative response to global disruption. These two volumes will make a timely contribution to the national conversation on these two important subjects as we rethink our conventional approach to policy making.
One of the reasons that undoubtedly encouraged the organisers of this evenings book launch is the fact that the two volumes publish a number of authors in common, three of them members of the RMITs academic staff. Paul Battersby, Damian Grenfell and Vandra Harris are each repeat performers, and I congratulate them on their energy and enterprise.
Humanitarian intervention is an expression worth examining critically. We all agree that human rights and the rule of law are worth advocating and defending. Indeed, the defence of a nations values against an aggressor who would wish to destroy it is one of the most fundamental principles justifying a governments decision to embark on warfare - the jus ad bellum that is one of the leitmotifs of the volume Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention in the 21^st Century.
But the term humanitarian intervention becomes ambiguous when a democratic state begins to contemplate the use of armed force to sanction a state that can no longer itself protect the rights of its citizens, or a state that actually seeks to withdraw those rights from its citizens.
Humanitarian intervention or the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is not a universal element of the jus ad bellum. It has not been invoked as grounds for international intervention in the civil wars of Africa, notwithstanding its having been used as justification for intervention in the Balkans and in Iraq.
Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention in the 21^st Century presents a sustained analysis that supports a substantial measure of caution in advancing humanitarian intervention as a justification for employing armed force against another country, or seeking to intervene in the affairs of another country. The twelve carefully crafted essays plot a well calibrated course through the shifting sands of limited warfare in the modern era, the limits of sovereignty, the ethics of intervention, the politics and economics of post-intervention reconstruction, and humanitarian engagement. Given that this volume seeks to illuminate a question through a series of contrasting essays, I should touch upon a few of the thematic issues that the authors have raised.
First, the very term humanitarian intervention lacks precision, and may just as easily be used by a national leader wishing to interfere wilfully in the affairs of another state, as by a national leader who sees an ethical and moral necessity supporting an armed intervention. That lack of precision does not add much cogency to humanitarian intervention as a principle supporting jus ad bellum.
Second, there are no clearly codified rules associated with humanitarian intervention, or the Responsibility to Protect. It is preferable that any military intervention in the affairs of another state be mandated by a resolution of the UN Security Council. The International Force East Timor (INTERFET), which Australia led, was mandated by the UN Security Council to restore peace and order in East Timor in 1999. The decision by the coalition of the willing to intervene in Iraq in 2003 was not pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution, mainly due to the exercise of the permanent member veto right. These two examples illustrate the problem that the authors have identified.
Third, when humanitarian intervention becomes a strategic objective necessitating military operations, it inevitably becomes subsumed by the momentum of military operations and the kinetics of armed conflict. The end state may be overlooked or ignored, or simply be defined as the cessation of military activity. The impacts of humanitarian intervention on the civilian population and the restoration of a viable government, viable civil institutions and a working economy may prove to be just too hard, with the result that the status quo post is no better, or possibly worse, than the status quo ante.
Fourth, this has serious implications for the respective roles of a stabilising military force and the NGOs and other civil society institutions that seek to build the peace. And while the following observation may appear to be pushing the authors envelope a little, where humanitarian intervention doesnt accord a full role to reconstruction agencies in the aftermath of military operations, the intervention is unlikely to succeed.
And finally, as Vandra Harris so poignantly observes in the books final chapter, to maximise the potential success of any humanitarian intervention, NGOs cannot be subsumed within the military machine. Their independence and operational autonomy has both to be protected and respected by the military forces that seek to keep or enforce the peace and stability.
Clausewitz said that war is the continuation of policy by other means. And by other he evidently meant armed force. In order to secure the peace, the emphasis changes: the concept other becomes irrelevant. And this, perhaps, is why the term intervention is fraught. As we have seen in the past thirty years, reconstruction so often depends on reconciliation for its success reconciliation that is driven more by convention and invention than by intervention.
While disaster and tragedy are almost always the precursors of humanitarian intervention, hope and generosity are more usually the precursors of international development. But there is no doubt that one of the most critical aspects of humanitarian intervention is the need for community and nation-building in the aftermath of armed conflict an issue that both books deal with.
Paul Battersby and Ravi Roy have made an outstanding contribution to the world of international development policy studies by bringing together a distinguished panel of authors who cover a sizeable part of the development waterfront. From globalisation to gender, from corruption to climate, from governance to ethics and religion, the essays in this volume provide a sustained analysis of the key preoccupations of contemporary policy planners, program designers and project managers.
These twenty six authors, collaborating on eighteen essays, have put international development under the spotlight. And at a time that the need for effective international development is growing while the resources are plateauing, where they are not falling, this volume, International Development: A Global Perspective on Theory and Practice,is both necessary and timely.
In my view, Professors Battersby and Roy identify the central issue underpinning current thinking on development by dealing with it holistically and systematically. As they say, global development is something constituted by the myriad aspirations, social circumstances, happenings and daily routines of people grappling with the consequences of globalization in localities across the globe.
It is one thing to identify globalisation as the underlying economic driver of international development. It is altogether another to operationalise that insight, to detail not only the impacts of globalisation but also to offer some practical pointers to how globalisation can be played into improved development outcomes.
It is here that International Development offers a number of creative and innovative suggestions. Professor Anil Hira, for instance, points to the need for distributional and equity issues to be addressed, and to shift development values by engaging the public. This is an apparently simple idea ensuring that people have a stake in development efforts that affect them.
But it is an idea that, in a number of ways, goes to the central theme of the book: of the idea of globalisation as a constructive and unifying force in international development, as opposed to globalisation as a contributor to the disjunction that worries a number of the books contributors.
Australia has a deep interest in ensuring that globalisation continues to be a constructive and unifying force, and international development is one of the vehicles we can use in this pursuit.
Labors approach to Australian aid is both purposive and principled, and is guided by the following points:

• Making poverty reduction and poverty eradication core objectives of the aid program;
• Ensuring that Australias national interests are also served by the program, primarily through the protection of peace, stability and prosperity in our region;
• Focusing on the areas of development where Australia is best placed to make a meaningful difference; and
• Making an effective contribution, through constructive internationalism, to the international rules-based order and Australia's ability to influence in global and regional affairs.

As Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd said, "Our belief in a fair go does not stop at the Australian continental shelf our aid program is therefore a product of our values."
In a world with growing inequality, with 766 million people 385 million of them children living on less than $1.90 a day in 2013, this approach is even more important today.
As many of you would know, democratisation is often addressed within the frame of international development, often with the political overtone of using international development assistance as a vector for installing democratic government. A number of this books authors display a measure of sensitivity regarding the fact that government-funded international development is normally driven by national interests, as distinct from equity, justice or other ethical considerations.
That, I think, is in the nature of things, and I would take it as a given. I shall return to this point in a moment.
The more interesting dimension of democratisation of international development is the full participation of those on the receiving end of international development in the design and management of the programs and projects of which they are the intended beneficiaries. This, I think, is where the book turns over some new ground.
Several of the essays offer interesting and constructive comment on the delivery of international development programs. The need for streamlining to ensure that investment gets to the grass roots the people in need is compelling.
Their authors touch on cultural sensitivity as a prerequisite for both policy and practice, and it is certainly the case that recognition of and respect for the cultural dynamics of a recipient group or society offer powerful inducements for participation at the grass roots level. In the domain of international development, a bottom up approach to issues of governance, ownership and control is often the most successful approach.
In my opinion, when people are fully engaged in designing and running their own lives, rather than obediently implementing the directions of others, their communities are more likely to be harmonious, stable and secure.
This brings me back to the question of national interests that I touched on just a moment ago.
A couple of weeks ago, I spoke at Sydneys Lowy Institute on Australias national interests in a time of disruption. In that speech, I said that development assistance, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, remains a critical element in Australias ability to realise its national interests.
Cuts to development assistance not only worsen the lives of people living in poverty, but contribute to instability with consequences that impact on the stability of development assistance recipients and on our security interests more generally.
The fact is that prosperity generally militates against instability, and development assistance is a significantly lower hit to the budget than is the deployment of the Australian Defence force, whether for humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping. For example, conservative projections estimate that a dollar spent on disaster risk reduction activities in development investment, saves up to fifteen dollars on deployments made in the aftermath of a disaster.
And more than that, as I pointed out at the Lowy Institute, cuts to Australias development assistance also diminish our ability to make our voice heard and contribute to global efforts to alleviate poverty.
I know that none of you here this evening would expect me to forego an opportunity to comment on Australias current international development assistance performance.
As I said, our international development program supports security and stability in our region, and more broadly. But since coming to power, the Abbott and Turnbull governments have been relentless in slashing our development assistance funding. They have cut $11.3 billion from our aid budget, and have abandoned the bipartisan commitment to GNI growth. Since 2013, they have cut the development budget by almost 25 percent.
Australia is now spending just 22 cents in every $100 on international development the lowest level in history. This is not just a source of international embarrassment to Australia, but it is at odds with the generous spirit of the Australian people.
One hopes that the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, found time to tell Prime Minister Turnbull during their recent conversation in London that Britain, with all its current economic difficulties, has an aid budget that annually meets the target of 0.7 percent of GNI as its contribution to international development, and has legislated to ensure that this remain the case.
For much of Australias post WW2 history, Australias approach to international development assistance has been remarkably continuous and consistent, notwithstanding changes of government. Bipartisanship in what we used to call aid policy is important if our development assistance programs are to generate enduring confidence in the partnership that our development assistance recipients have with us. We need to work with our regional neighbours to build their confidence in their futures.
The unfortunate consequence of the Turnbull governments destruction of bipartisanship on this important area of public policy is that the regions confidence in its own ability to build sustainable stability and generate long-term prosperity is undermined.
There would be no one more aware than the people in this room that the world is groaning under the weight of demand for international development and hamstrung by the lack of resources.
From slightly different perspectives, the two books that I am launching tonight address this problem by exploring new ways of thinking about international development, new ways of practising international development, and improving the post-conflict stage of humanitarian intervention.
We know we are going to have to do more with less, we are going to have to do it more efficiently, and we are going to have to improve the effectiveness of both our humanitarian intervention and our international development.
Disruptive technologies are already changing the way in which we live, work, connect with each other, get information and have fun. We need to think much more laterally about how international development is imagined and operated.
Terms like donors and recipients may suggest an overly paternalistic approach to international development. The two books we are considering this evening, in contrast, pick up on the inclusive themes of collaboration and participation in addressing development.
As the editors of International Development say in their introductory essay,

Participatory development approaches stress the need for all participants, local communities and international institutions, to participate in learning. To date, most participatory approaches have focused on technique rather than on the underlying reason for participation, namely the need for the traditional development establishment to learn and transform itself.

We do not deal with a disrupted world by continuing to operate outmoded systems or by taking a things as usual approach. While disruption is certainly unsettling, and often causes uncertainty and fear, it also generates opportunities for innovation and creativity. Thats exactly what is needed now, as we contemplate the results of humanitarian intervention and the growing demand for international development.
We need to re-invest in an international crisis management and development system that is rules-based, that respects human rights and observes the rule of law. We need to engage with like-minded countries to maximise our chances of success, given that the values that bring nations together and ensure cohesion are under threat.
The hopes and values that have driven economic growth for the past half century are now under attack by those who seek short-term political advantage at the expense of long-term peace, prosperity and stability.
These are the things that we must continue to strive for, modestly and confidently, and with optimism. And optimism that the world can be a better place is what fundamentally brings these two volumes of essays together.
So it is my honour to declare them launched.